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Analyzing the Demand Side Approach to Housing 
&e Nation's Poor, Using Grand Rapids Data 
'_, John W. Reifel 
Editor's note: This article discusses one aspect 
of a major study recently completed by 
Associate Professor John W. Reifel, of the 
Economics Department. The work was 
funded by a grant from the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development. 
The Housing Act of 1949 established as a 
national goal the "provision and availability 
of a decent home and suitable living environ, 
ment for every American family." In ecent 
ears a maJ'or policy deb te h b e r dY	 a as e n wage as to whether a demand side or a supply side 
approach would be more efficient at helpin 
the country meet the 1949 goal. A supply Sid~ 
approach increases the housin to k th 0 h 
programs that subsidize new ~:ns~ructro~~r 
rehabilitation of existing units. A demand side 
approach directly subsidizes poor households 
financially to enable them to rent or purchase 
larger and better quality housing. 
Historically, this country has relied on a 
supply side approach toward improving hous­
ing conditions for the poor. Public hOUSing, 
below market interest rate subSidy programs, 
and the New Construction component of the 
Section 8 Housing Program have generated 
new housing specifically for the poor. Fi­
nanciallY overshadowing these programs, 
owever, have been the federal income tax 
•	 rovisions that subsidize homeowners by 
allowing them to exclude from income the 
potential rental value of housing services 
received, yet itemize as deductions the mort­
gage interest and property tax costs of 
generating the services. In fact, the annual 
cost to the Treasury of these tax provisions, 
the bulk of which are realized by middle- and 
upper'income homeowners, exceeds all of 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (H.U.D.) spending on construc­
tion specifically designed for poor households. 
These tax break subsidies to homeowners lead 
to improved housing conditions for poor 
households through a filtering process. Over 
long periods of time, as housing units age and 
the neighborhoods deteriorate, individual 
housing units frequently filter down from the 
middle- and upper-income households who 
built them to households with successively 
lower economic status. If the neighborhood 
continues to decline, eventually the poor are 
able to move in when those who are 
economically better off vacate their houses 
and move to a better neighborhood. 
Economists have observed that this supply 
side approach is a very slow and indirect way 
to improve housing conditions for households 
currently living in units with serious defi­
ciencies. 
In recent years many economists have ad­
• 
vocated a policy switch to a demand side ap­
proach. Subsidizing the buying power of poor 
households would provide them with the pur­
chaSing power to re-enter the housing market 
and rent or buy better quality units. Slum 
housing exists not because landlords take ad­
vantage of poor tenants but rather because 
landlords are business people who, in order 
to avoid economic losses, must provide a level 
of services that matches the low-rent,paying 
ability of their tenants. If the rent'paying ability 
of the poor were to be raised by a housing 
allowance, they would shop for better hous, 
mg. Competition among the many suppliers 
in any given housing market would assure that 
higher rents would buy better housing and not 
. 	 I' fl t f' f h' I' Asimp y In ~ e pro Its 0 ousmg supp lers. 
demand Side approach would be more ef­
ficient at meeting the national housing goal 
because subSidy dollars would go directly to 
the l?oor, w~o would b~ able to afford better 
quahty hOUSing Immedlat~ly. T.hls approach 
~oul~ aVOid the current difficulties, e~pecI~lIy 
m eVId~nce In .the suburbs, of selectmg SItes 
for publlc.houslng developments. ~lso, smce 
the mobIlIty of the poor would be Increased, 
it would tend to reduce ec:momic and :a~ial 
se~regatlon. Finally, since Improving eXIstm~ 
Units IS cheaper than new construcbon, It 
should be less expensive per poor household 
served. 
Note that the Existing Housing component 
of the Section 8 Housing Program, begun in 
1974, has many elements similar to a demand 
side program. The major differences are that 
under Section 8 households do not have an 
incentive to find least cost units (because they 
must always pay 25 percent of their income) 
and the subSidy (the difference between rent 
and 25 percent of income) is paid directly to 
the landlord 
The income elasticity of demand for hous, 
ing is a key policy variable in the demand side 
approach. This elasticity is calculated as the 
percentage increase in hOUSing consumption 
that results from an increase in income divided 
by the percentage increase in income. For ex, 
ample, consider a household with an $800 
a month income that currently pays $200 a 
month in rent. If, when that household 
receives an unrestricted monthly housing 
allowance of $100, the household moves to 
a larger or better quality unit costing $250 a 
month, that household's income elasticity of 
demand would be 2 [calculated as 
(50/200)/(100/800) =2]. Theoretically, the 
income elasticity of demand for housing can 
vary from 0 (no response) to infinity. The 
larger the elasticity, the more of any 
unrestricted housing allowance that will go 
toward improved housing. 
It would, of course, be possible to design 
the program to reqUire that all housing 
allowance subsidies go for housing. Though 
this is politically appealing to legislators and 
their constituents who care about poor hous­
ing but do not care to subsidize television sets 
or cars for poor households, such restriCtions 
Violate the economic principle of consumer 
5 
sovereignty. The overall level of satisfaction 
for a society, given any particular income 
distribution (including the dollar value of sub­
sidies) will be maximized when individuals are 
free to choose how resources are to be used. 
Realistically speaking, in order for a demand 
side approach to be politically acceptable, 
more stringent restrictions would have to be 
placed on how the housing allowances may 
be used the smaller the income elasticity of 
demand for housing is, especially if it is in­
elastic (less than 1.0). The current federal 
d f' 	 . d' h .. b Ce IClt Ictates t ese restnctlons ecause on­
gress has refused to pass a negative income 
tax (essentially a program of unrestricted in­
come transfers) even when the Federal budget 
deficits were low ~nd Presidents Nixon and 
Carter supported It. 
When this debate about the demand side 
approach began back in the 1970's, the 
primitive studies available at that time yielded 
estimates of income elasticity that ranged from 
.2 to 2.1. The methodologies employed in the 
studies differed in important ways. Some 
studies were based on either mean or median 
values for census tracts or citi~s (aggregated 
data) and others were based on observations 
of individual households (micro data). Some 
were based on the household's current in­
come, which often fluctuates Widely from year 
to year, and others were based on unobserved 
permanent income, the stable income a 
household expects to average over time based 
on its human capital. Some studies analyzed 
the behavior of owners; others analyzed the 
behavior of renters. Not all the studies took 
into account the fact that households do not 
instantaneously change their housing con­
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sumption the moment their economic circum­
stances change. Neither did all of the studies 
take into account the demographic 
characteristics of the household such as size 
and race. 
To get a more precise estimate of the in­
come elasticity of demand for housing and to 
test how housing allowance programs with 
various types of restrictions might work, 
H.U.D. funded several experiments. Its major 
experiment, called the Experimental Housing 
Allowance Program (E.H.A.P.l, funded pro­
grams in 12 cities that tested alternative 
versions and aspects of a housing allowance 
demand side program. The income elasticity 
of demand for housing estimates derived from 
E.H.A.P., which analyzed only renter house­
holds, did not exceed. 72. This indicated that 
the elasticity is quite inelastic. In addition to 
this major experiment, H.U.D. funded several 
other studies including mine. 
The Census Bureau administered the 
44-page Annual Housing Survey to 5,000 
households in the Grand Rapids SMSA dur­
ing the 12-month period beginning in March, 
1976, and ending in February, 1977. The 
survey includes extensive questions on hous­
ing consumption and household income, 
precisely what is needed to calculate the in­
come elasticity of demand, but, since the data 
is collected under the promise of confiden­
tiality, the information is available to the public 
only in summary reports. I obtained the Cen­
sus Bureau's agreement that they would con­
duct requested tests by agreeing to supply to 
them micro data on the exterior of the Grand 
Rapids housing units (which I had helped the 
Kent County Health Department to collect in 
1976) and individual 1976 crime totals for 
each of Grand Rapids' 32 police districts 
(which I calculated from a printout of all 1976 
crimes supplied by the Police Department). 
The data tape which the Census Bureau 
created from matching and merging the three 
separate data sources gave complete micro 
household data on 530 owner-occupied units 
and 275 renter-occupied units in Grand 
Rapids. 
Determining the income elasticity of 
demand for housing requires the creation and 
statistical estimation of models of household 
demand for housing. The necessary models 
were created and estimated. For owner units 
housing consumption was measured as the 
reported market value of the house and lot. 
For renter units housing consumption was 
measured as a standardized gross rent that in­
cluded contract rent plus additional monthly 
payment for utilities. Household income was 
defined alternatively as either total current in­
come received by all household members or 
as a permanent income proxy created by a 
prediction equation based on the household 
head's education, age, sex, and race. 
The major finding of my study indicated 
that the income elasticity of demand for hous­
ing was quite inelastic (less than 1.0). Income 
elasticity estimates based on owner units 
ranged from .459 to .198, while estimates 
based on renter units ranged from .251 to 
.156. Since the housing demand behavior of 
low-income households is particularly relevant 
for policy purposes, separate analyses were 
conducted for the 88 owner and the 116 
renter household subsamples whose incomes 
did not exceed approximately 150 percent of 
the appropriate official 1976 poverty 
thresholds. All of the income elasticity 
estimates for low-income owners and renters 
were quite inelastic, ranging from .342 to 
.145. Evidence was found to support the 
hypothesis that among owner households, 
those headed by single adults have smaller in­
come elasticity of demand for housing than 
those whose heads are married. For renters, 
the more individuals in the household, the 
more rent was paid. If the head of a renter 
household was black, that had no statistically 
significant effect on amount of rent paid. For 
owners, most of the estimated models re­
vealed that having larger households had no 
effect on the value of the housing units 
owned. If the head of an owner household 
was black, most of the estimated models 
revealed that the value of the housing unit was 
significantly less. This could result from black 
owners preferring lower quality housing than 
whites, from racially discriminatory housing 
practices, or from whites' willingness to pay 
a premium to live in racially segregated 
neighborhoods. 
When households spend more on housing, 
what housing characteristics do they purchase 
more of? Though the E.H.A.P. did not at­
tempt to answer this question, my study 
specifically examined the demands for rooms 
and for neighborhoods with low crime rates. 
The income elasticities of demand for these 
specific housing characteristics were found to 
be inelastic in all cases except for one demand 
for low crime model where the elasticity waA 
-1.001. _ 
The primary policy implication of all of this 
analysis is that a demand side approach to im­
proving housing conditions for the poor will 
work only if conditions or restrictions are 
placed on how housing allowance dollars may 
be used. For example, some large percen­
tage, such as 70 or 90 percent, of the sub­
sidy dollars must be allocated to improved 
housing. Or, receipt of the housing allowance 
could be made conditional on the household 
living in a unit that meets certain minimum 
standards. The E.H.A.P. tested 17 different 
possible program designs. 
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